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Abstract
What is meaning? And how does it arise? Werner and Kaplan’s approach to symbol
formation was prescient in understanding the importance of the body and activity.
However, their embodied approach needs to be complemented by a broader concep-
tualization of social institutions and complex semiotic structures in the genesis and
function of symbolic processes. Specifically, human bodies, which are the medium and
locus of experience, are embedded in social situations and institutions. Thus embodied
experience, the origin of meaning, must be understood as societally structured.
Moreover, human experience is never unmediated; it is refracted through the complex
semiotic artifacts that comprise human culture, such as discourses, social representa-
tions and symbolic resources. The present article focuses on the importance of bodies
moving within institutions and minds moving within semiotic structures as a basis for
meaning making. We argue that such movement has been neglected; yet, it has the
potential to enhance our understanding of how experiences are differentiated and
integrated within individuals to produce individuals who are products of society and
who also have agency in relation to society.
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which should be used for any reference to this work
What is meaning? And how does it arise? Werner and Kaplan (1963) chose to tackle
these fundamental questions through informed theoretical discussion and a series of
patient and original empirical studies. Their ﬁndings were prescient, demonstrating
the grounding of symbolic representation in the human activity, speciﬁcally the body
and its sense organs. They also insisted that symbol formation is a fundamentally
social process; however, the social dimension was underdeveloped.
In the present article we build on Werner and Kaplan’s conception of symbol
formation, elaborating the underdeveloped social aspect. The article begins with an
outline of Werner and Kaplan’s basic theory, highlighting the focus on embodi-
ment as a main strength, and advancing the critique that their conception of ‘‘the
social’’ is relatively thin. The conceptualization of the social which we introduce
stands in marked contrast to the usual emphasis on ‘‘the other’’ and social inter-
action. In contrast, we emphasize ﬁrst social structures (both institutions and semi-
otic artifacts) and then show how the movement of bodies and minds within such
social structures catalyzes meaning making.
An organismic-developmental approach to symbol
formation
Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. iii) had the commendable aim of creating an ‘‘orga-
nismic-developmental’’ approach to language and ‘‘the expression of thought.’’
The term ‘‘organismic’’ indicates a holistic and somewhat functional approach
grounded in the body and practice of organisms. The term ‘‘developmental’’ indi-
cates that any understanding of symbol formation needs to be grounded in the
ontogenetic development of the organism. Their approach is clearly diﬀerent from
behaviorist accounts of ‘‘verbal behavior’’ (e.g. Ogden & Richards, 1930; Skinner,
1957) which, they argue (pp. 13–14), reduce meaning (i.e. symbols) to mere ‘‘signs’’
or ‘‘signals’’ in the environment which trigger a response.1 Their approach is also
clearly diﬀerent from theories which search for the origins of meaning in cognitive
universals (e.g. Chomsky, 1995), because their approach emphasizes the active
organism in a social world (Glick, 2013, pp. 441–452). Their organismic approach
is aligned with the work of von Uexku¨ll (1992), being holistic as opposed to reduc-
tionist (Markova´, 1982), and accordingly is paradigmatically aligned with the work
of Vygotsky and Luria (1994/1932) and Mead (1922).
Numerous diverse and highly original empirical studies led Werner and Kaplan
(1963, p. 41) to a model of symbol formation that has four components: the
addressor (or the symbolizer), the addressee (or the audience), the referent being
symbolized and the symbol vehicle (see Mu¨ller, Yeung, & Hutchison, 2013, pp.
463–483). These four components are, in the experience of the child, initially fused
and un-diﬀerentiated. Symbol formation is the gradual diﬀerentiation and integra-
tion of these four components, such that the addressor becomes able to use the
symbol vehicle to represent the referent for the addressee. In this model, the mean-
ing of a symbol between an addressee and an addressor does not need to be ‘‘the
same,’’ but rather, ‘‘the only requirement is that the connotations evoked in both
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addressor and addressee occupy a comparable position within each person’s net-
work of meaning’’ (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 50).
Werner and Kaplan (1963) were ahead of their time in recognizing the embodied
nature of meaning. While James (1890), Dewey (1896), Mead (1912), and to a lesser
extent Vygotsky (1997), had made general claims about the link between meaning
and action (i.e. the meaning of a bicycle is to ride it), they had not backed these
claims up with research. Werner and Kaplan (1963), on the other hand, provide
detailed evidence of the way in which our senses, experiences, and even mood are
constitutive of meaning, even complex conceptual meaning. For example, they
report research by Krauss who asked 45 people to draw linear patterns for 18
words referring to moods, colors, natural happenings, actions, etc. The participants
drew ‘‘expressive’’ motives – for instance a long line for ‘‘longing’’ and a curly line
for ‘‘gay’’ (p. 340). One participant states, about their line for ‘‘gay,’’ that it ‘‘is a
leaping, bounding, joyousness; that’s also the case for the line – leaps and then a
bound’’ (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 339). Thus, they illustrate how there is a
deeply embodied, even visceral, aspect to meaning which is maintained across
modalities. In this way their work has foreshadowed the more recent work on
embodied metaphors (Cornejo, Olivares, & Rojas, 2013; Lakoﬀ & Johnson,
1999), gesture (Levy & McNeill, 2013; McNeill, 2000), activity (Miettinen,
Paavola, & Pohjola, 2012) and habitus (Lizardo, 2013).
Leaving aside the obvious strength of Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) model for
addressing the embodied aspects of meaning, let us focus on its weaker aspect,
namely the social aspect. How does the social operate within their model? Their
model, we suggest, is social in three ways: First, symbols are oriented to an addres-
see, being used to communicate with the addressee. Second, for symbols to be
communicative the addressee and addressor need to partially share a ﬁeld of nor-
mative meanings. Third, children learn symbols from others, imitating them at ﬁrst,
and only later becoming autonomous users of symbols. Thus, the social is primarily
in the form of another person (the addressee) who is the target of communication,
has a partially shared conception of what symbols mean, and from whom people
learn what symbols mean. Thus, even when Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 361)
consider complex meanings, such as ‘‘modesty,’’ which subjects relate to being
‘‘nun-like,’’ or familiar lines such as ‘‘the lady doth protest too much,’’ there is a
tendency to underplay the broader cultural context (but see Werner, 1957).
The aim of the present article is to augment Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) concep-
tualization with a more ﬂeshed out understanding of the role of social institutions
(and people’s trajectories through them) and more complex trans-individual meaning
structures (such as discourses, representations, or symbolic resources) in meaning
making. The following two sections elaborate on these two omissions in turn.
Bodies moving within social institutions
Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 41) model of symbol formation, speciﬁcally their
addressee–addressor–symbol–referent rhombus, is depicted outside of any context
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(i.e. situation, context, institution or society). The model ‘‘hangs’’ in unspeciﬁed
ether. Where is this symbol use occurring? Who are the actors? What were their
previous experiences? What institutional structures are shaping the interaction?
What are the partially agreed norms and expectations? That these considerations
are largely absent is not particularly important from Werner and Kaplan’s stand-
point, because their conceptualization of meaning begins with individual expres-
sion, and grows outward, towards social relationships and society. But this
omission becomes signiﬁcant if one gives the social a more constitutive role in
symbol formation.
According to Mead (1922), meaning begins with the actions of one organism
having consequences for a second organism, such that the action of the ﬁrst organism
‘‘creates an impression’’ on the second organism. For example, the ﬁrst
organism might prepare an attack, and the second organism ﬂees. The sight of the
preparation to attack is a visual cuewhich comes tomean ‘‘time to ﬂee’’ for the second
organism (but it means nothing to the ﬁrst organism). The developmental break-
through is for the ﬁrst organism to realize that its action is a cue, at which
point, the action becomes symbolic (or signiﬁcantly symbolic) in the sense that
the ﬁrst organism can use the action to cause the second organism to run
away.This account of symbol formation, crucially, begins notwith a ‘‘will to express’’
but rather with ‘‘unintended impressions.’’ It is the response of the second organ-
ism, the addressee, which constitutes the meaning of the symbol for the
addressor. Interestingly, Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 16) come close to recognizing
this when they write: ‘‘a gesture directly and unintentionally expressing an emo-
tion such as joy or disgust is not symbolic; the so-called ‘symbolism’ of gestural
and postural patterns may be symbolic for the interpreter, but they are not for the
producing individual.’’ However, Werner and Kaplan do not elaborate this point,
failing to see it as an opening to a more profoundly social conception of meaning
making.
If one accepts that symbolic meaning begins with unintended impressions, then
the question becomes: How does a young infant become aware of the communi-
cative signiﬁcance of their own actions? First, we need a conception of social
institutions; that is, a cultural–historical pattern of interaction, with diﬀerentiated
social positions (each with role-expectations, and maybe also rights and responsi-
bilities). Second, there needs to be bodies moving between these social positions,
such that infants can cultivate and internalize both the unintended communicative
activity and the communicative signiﬁcance of that activity.
Let us take Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 41) addressor and addressee and
situate them in a socio-historical pattern of interaction, such as, a family unit.
Imagine parents and two children, an infant girl and a four-year-old boy. The
infant is crying. The father, mother, and boy strive to comfort the infant with
food, cuddles and attention. The family is enacting a small but widespread social
practice. The crying infant does not know the impression that its crying creates. At
most the infant begins to associate crying with food and comfort, and those posi-
tive outcomes may even reinforce the crying – but this is not suﬃcient to make the
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crying symbolic (in Werner & Kaplan’s sense or signiﬁcant symbolic in Mead’s
sense) for the infant. The infant does not ‘‘intend’’ to ‘‘mean’’ anything by crying.
But, now let us turn to the four-year-old boy. The boy participates in trying to feed
and comfort the distressed infant. The boy is socialized into the social position of
caring, and internalizes those practices and meanings. The boy learns to recognize
the infant’s crying as calling-out a care-giving response. This gets interesting when
we expand our analysis beyond the isolated situation. Later it will be the boy who
cries, and when he does, his cries have both internality and externality. He cries like
the infant, but also responds to his own cries like the parents because he has
internalized their care-giving response through his own actions towards the
infant. Quite likely these care-giving responses have also been rehearsed through
play with dolls and in the narrative structure of stories and books. In short, he
begins to know the meaning for crying. He can intentionally ‘‘use’’ crying; for
example, he might induce his own crying so as to obtain the caring response.
Thus, the crying becomes meaningful. The four elements in Werner and
Kaplan’s model (the crying, the care-giving response, the crier and the responder)
have become diﬀerentiated and integrated into a higher-level semantic structure.
Gillespie (2005a) and Martin and Gillespie (2010) have argued that the key
mechanism which turns an action, such as crying, into a symbol is ‘‘position
exchange’’. The non-intentional expression of spontaneous crying becomes an
intentional expression through the boy’s movement between social positions
within a relatively stable institutional structure. The institution we are dealing
with is the family, and speciﬁcally the micro-institution of caring. It is a culturally
patterned joint activity, it is initiated by normatively accepted markers (such as
crying), each party makes sense of the situation through resources such as role
models, strategies, caring words, expected narratives and norms of response. The
social positions are that of caregiver and care-receiver. These social positions are
relatively stable, and the interaction repeats itself in similar, but never identical,
ways. However, what does change is the social position that the participants
occupy. The boy sometimes cries and sometimes responds to the crying of another
(the infant or maybe even an adult). What becomes crucial is the boy’s trajectory,
or movement, between the social positions within the relatively stable institution,
or social architecture, of care-giving. It is this trajectory through both roles within
the social activity of care-giving which enables the boy to internalize the entire
activity, becoming aware of the meaning of many aspects of the activity from both
perspectives within the activity.
The emergence of meaning out of bodies moving between socially structured
situations and roles also operates at the level of play. It is notable that children
often role play the social positions that are of consequence for them, but which they
don’t get to occupy in practice – such as playing at being a parent or teacher
(Edwards, 2000). One contender for a universal in children’s play is the doll, and
the doll is usually an infant. Arguably, children are using the infant doll as a
cultural support to enable the child to explore the social position of being an
adult. Playing which responds to the infant doll, the crying doll, the hungry doll,
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the sleeping doll, enables children to explore the meaning of their own actions from
the standpoint of their parents. Equally, at the level of ﬁction and narrative, the
same movements between social positions occur. For example, in the story Hansel
and Gretel, Hansel, the elder brother, comforts Gretel in the forest when she is
crying because they have been abandoned. To understand the relationship, one
needs to understand both sides of the interaction; namely, Gretel’s urge to cry and
Hansel’s desire to comfort her. The narrative structure is like an institution; it is a
sociocultural scaﬀold supporting the meanings of both sides of the interaction. The
next section focuses upon complex semiotic artifacts, like narratives, demonstrating
again how movement within these structures feeds into meaning making.
Minds moving within complex semiotic artifacts
Analyzing the construction of meaning of symbols, Werner and Kaplan (1963)
identify the genesis of the meaning of words, ﬁrst in the child and later in the
adult. Drawing on Bu¨hler, they acknowledge that the meaning of symbols have
to be understood as these belong to ﬁelds or systems of relations, which refer to the
structure of a given language as a whole (Chapter 4). Then Werner and Kaplan
explore how we elaborate the meaning of unknown concepts in the context of their
uses in sentences (Chapter 13), and how we attribute expressive or emotional
qualities to the sonorous qualities of words (Chapter 20). Across these empirical
studies the unit of analysis is usually a single or compound word. It is only towards
the end of their book that they consider more complex constructions, such as ‘‘he
opens a bottle’’ (p. 385), ‘‘he catches a criminal’’ (p. 396), and ‘‘I am sad if I lose’’
(p. 460). Thus, although they emphasize the role of semantic ﬁelds in constructing
meaning, their own empirical work tends to sidestep this issue. Meaning, we sug-
gest, needs to be understood in relation to a semantic ﬁeld for three reasons.
First, all utterances have addressivity. They are replies to previous utterances
and anticipations of forthcoming ones (Bakhtin, 1982, 1984, 1996). We can never
escape the ﬁeld of meanings. Consciousness ﬂows, sometimes being externalized
through one or the other semiotic mode, and one meaning only ever gives way to
another meaning, like waves lapping one over the other (James, 1890). The sen-
tences we produce are just one very partial surface aspect of this ﬂow, and as such,
they are, again, both responses and anticipations, marked by the undertones of
older meanings, awaking the echoes of others, and carrying the harmonics of pre-
vious contexts of use (Bakhtin, 1982, 1996).
Second, most of the ideas and cultural artifacts we encounter are not reducible
to simple sentences. The social representation of new migrants, Die Hard III, a
newspaper article, or Anna Karenina are each a holistic ﬁeld of meaning. Such
artifacts are made out of chains of sentences or ﬁelds of semiotic units. Others,
like a prayer or a legal article, take their meaning from their being part of a larger
semiotic system (such as the legal system, or a religion). As consequence, we never
deal with only one concept at a time. Most of the semiotic constructs we meet are
complex, and understanding the whole is more than understanding each
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component in turn. For example, making sense of a movie is more than under-
standing the sum of the words used in the ﬁlm. Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) study
of people’s understanding of words in context suggests that meaning is part of
a more general Gestalt, or as Valsiner (2007) would say, as part of a ﬁeld-like
meaning. Yet what interests the authors is more how, and within that context,
words participate in the elaboration or tonality of a sentence, which is demon-
strated by experiences on word permutation (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 455), not
how the sentence itself contributes to making a narrative, a collective memory or an
ideology.
Finally, we are exposed to a multiplicity of complex cultural discourses, whether
these are foregrounded or in the background (Lyotard, 1984). Consider browsing a
newspaper or watching TV in between a family discussion and concerns about
work issues. Simply walking down a street entails navigating not only other
people, but also the diverse meanings of shop displays, advertisements, and polit-
ical posters. How can such a cacophony of meanings be understood? With their
focus on single words or sentences, isolated from the semiosphere, Werner and
Kaplan (1963) do not give us tools to understand meaning making in real life
contexts. Accordingly, we suggest that it is important to move beyond the labora-
tory, and to examine how symbols are encountered in everyday life.
Taking account of the ﬁeld of meanings leads us to focus upon how people, or
speciﬁcally people’s minds, move within these ﬁelds of meaning. Movements within
ﬁelds of meaning are, perhaps, most evident in narratives. In a narrative, the person
is guided through various positions and experiences. For example, Miller,
Hoogstra, Mintz, Fung, and Williams (1993) show how Kurt (age 2) progressively
appropriates the story of Peter the Rabbit by asking his parents to narrate it again
and again, and regularly producing his own renditions. In his ﬁrst re-telling, Kurt
only mentioned one aspect of the story (a little rabbit is punished for eating for-
bidden vegetables). Later, he added more aspects (the angry gardener and the
rabbit’s appetite). Finally, he mastered the complexity of the narrative
(a ‘‘naughty’’ rabbit who disobeys its mother, might be punished, but will still be
loved by her). What does it mean to understand the narrative? It entails being able
to take the perspective of the hungry rabbit Peter, of the angry gardener, and the
worried mother. Each perspective has diﬀerent emotions, and the narrative arises
out of the holistic interaction of these perspectives. As Kurt understands the nar-
rative, so he increasingly understands the word ‘‘naughty,’’ with its normative,
conditional, and transient aspects. Kurt, like Peter the Rabbit, has enjoyed playing
in a garden, and like him he has felt hungry and angry, and maybe even worried.
These experiences, acquired in Kurt’s trajectory through the social world, are now
recombined, with the narrative providing a new trajectory through these experi-
ences, in the production of a largely novel experience.
Cultural artifacts, such as books, ﬁlms or even ideas and arguments, are multi-
modal (combining sound, image, words, etc.) semiotic structures which guide
experience, creating trajectories of meaning. These artifacts, just like the institu-
tions discussed in the preceding section, have an architecture which canalizes and
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guides experiences along particular routes and trajectories. A ﬁlm imposes a suc-
cession of moving images, kinetic impressions, and sounds. A painting guides the
gaze of the viewer with faces, eye gazes, contrasts, and surprising elements (Berger,
1972, p. 26). In his psychology of art, Vygotsky (1971) analyzed the structure of
literary or musical works to show how the organization of the characters, the
progression of the plot, the rhythm of the unfolding events, etc., were actually
guiding speciﬁc psychological and emotional responses. Thus ‘‘art is the social
technique of emotion’’ (Vygotsky, 1971, p. 249) which ‘‘organizes future behavior’’
(Vygotsky, 1971, p. 253). Moving beyond art, teaching materials, advertisements,
and political discourses are also complex semiotic structures which canalize trajec-
tories of meaning. Using available techniques (rhetoric, research on colors, shapes,
or sounds) for awakening speciﬁc embodied reaction, these semiotic structures
guide people through ideas, images, representations or values, whether these are
about the past, about alternative lives, or possible futures.
All cultural artifacts engage the personal memories and experiences of
their users, mobilizing and reorganizing these in the creation of new meaning.
In this sense, the meaning produced by cultural artifacts is not simply ‘‘derivative’’
of the everyday meanings which people have accumulated in their trajectories
through institutional and social worlds. These cultural artifacts create new
meanings and trajectories, which themselves leave traces, becoming open to
reconﬁguration in future cultural experiences, and also transforming people’s
daily experiences of the social and institutional world (Zittoun, 2006). In
other words, many layers and echoes of symbols and their meanings are residues
of people’s exploration of the complex semiotic architectures oﬀered by our
cultural environment. The more we travel through semiotic architectures, the
richer these meanings can become, as these are both anchored in personal experi-
ences, and in the vast universe of cultural values, narratives, and human accumu-
lated experience. Thus, despite drawing upon embodied and personal meanings
originating in the social and institutional world, so-called ﬁctional experiences
can transform our direct experience of the social and institutional world. For
example, tourists experience the Himalayas through narratives and ﬁlms, with
this ﬁeld of ﬁction broadening the horizons of what tourists can experience
(Gillespie, 2007).
Bodies and minds in movement: differentiating and
integrating experiences
Bodies are the locus and medium of experience, but bodies are not ﬂoating mid-air.
Speciﬁcally, human bodies are ﬁrmly situated within institutional practices and
complex webs of cultural meaning which are often tacit (Turner, 2012). But,
most importantly, we are emphasizing that bodies move through socially structured
experiences, and, in a likewise manner, human minds move through experiences
shaped by complex cultural artifacts. Such movement, we now argue, might under-
lie the diﬀerentiation and integration of experience.
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Central to Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 7) conceptualization is ‘‘the ortho-
genetic principle;’’ namely, the tendency of organisms to move from a state of
relative globality and undiﬀerentiatedness towards states of increasing diﬀerenti-
ation and hierarchic integration. This orthogenetic principle underlies the progres-
sive diﬀerentiation of the four components (addressor, addressee, symbol vehicle
and referent) of their model of symbol formation, with the increased integration
creating the interrelationships which allow for intentional symbolic processes (see
Mu¨ller et al., 2013, pp. 463–483). However, despite the descriptive insight of this
principle, the mechanism accounting for this process of diﬀerentiation and integra-
tion remains under speciﬁed. What drives the orthogenetic principle?
We want to suggest that it is movement which drives this diﬀerentiation and
integration. Speciﬁcally, bodies and minds moving through institutional and semi-
otic worlds (a) accumulate diﬀerentiated experiences and (b) have these experiences
integrated, or linked, one to the other, through the guided sequencing of those
diﬀerentiated experiences. This operates both at the level of bodies moving through
the social world and minds moving through ﬁctional, or entirely semiotic, worlds.
Moving within institutional structures diﬀerentiates experience: people get a
chance to be care-giver and care-receiver, to be buyer and seller, to be child and
parent and so on. Each new social position we take up constitutes a diﬀerentiated
domain of experience. But the movement between these social positions might also
help to integrate them, weaving together these otherwise disconnected domains of
experience, such that the integration forms an intersubjective structure, enabling
people to participate in diﬀerentiated but integrated perspectives within a social
activity. The meaning of ‘‘caring’’ is both care-giving and care-receiving, the mean-
ing of ‘‘buying’’ is both buying and selling, and so on (Gillespie, 2010b). Bodies,
with their rudimentary and embodied memory and moving between inter-related
social positions within institutional structures, are like threaded needles, stitching
together the domains of experience into an integrated and meaningful, and thus
intersubjective, whole.
Moving within semiotic structures, such as worlds of ﬁction or political dis-
courses, also diﬀerentiates and integrates experience. A narrative is not a single
action or experience, nor is it simply a sequence of actions or events as seen from
one person’s point of view. A narrative entails interacting points of view, and a
structured sequence of events. The stream of consciousness (James, 1890) chan-
neled through a narrative not only has a sequence of experiences cultivated, but
also usually participates in a play of perspectives and experiences. Narratives have
characters with diﬀerentiated interests, knowledge, values and emotions. To under-
stand a narrative is to participate in this multiplicity of interacting experiences. For
example, to understand a Japanese movie is to both participate in what the various
protagonists feel, and also, to grasp the narrative structure they are part of.
In addition, it is to feel moved by the colors and the shapes of the de´cor, and be
transported by the melody of the music, or the rhythm of the words and actions
(Zittoun, 2013). These diﬀerentiated experiences (embodied, emotional, linked to
identiﬁcation and reﬂection) are, here again, recombined and woven together in
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new ways from the start of the ﬁlm to the end in the production of a new
experience.
Symbols arise at the points where internal, personal, embodied and emotional
experiences meet an external social or semiotic structure. Meaning is where per-
sonal sense and shared meaning meet. The personal sense comes from our own
unique embodied trajectories. Although our experiences are socially determined,
that determination works on our own individual bodies, stirring individual emo-
tions, creating personal sense. This personal sense ﬁnds expression, or resonance, in
social settings and semiotic structures. Equally, these institutional settings and
semiotic structures need to ﬁnd the relevant personal sense, the relevant past
experiences and embodied memories in their participants, to function.
We embark daily into multiple worlds (Schu¨tz, 1945), moving through the insti-
tutions of family routine, to public transport, to daydreaming, to employment, to
alternatives imagined in conversation, to emailing and maybe ending the day with a
trip to the theatre or movies. This clash and play of situations and semiotic realms
leads to a conceptualization of human experience as complex, multi-layered,
reﬂective, partially integrated, and unresolved. Indeed, it is the incomplete integra-
tion, the disjunctions and tensions, which propel human meaning forward, just like
the unresolved elements in a narrative keep the audience engaged.
Conclusion: meaning making in motion
Theory and research which emphasize ‘‘the social’’ in human development and
meaning making have tended to focus upon ‘‘the other.’’ Questions concern
social interaction and the role of signiﬁcant others in scaﬀolding the emergence
of meaning. The present article has pointed to a diﬀerent route for the social
construction of meaning; namely, social institutions and complex semiotic artifacts.
Speciﬁcally, our focus has been on bodies and minds moving within institutions and
cultural artifacts. Thus, we build upon Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) conceptualiza-
tion of meaning as embodied, but expand upon this by putting the body in motion.
Bodies move within society, accumulating societally patterned experiences, which
in turn provide the resources for cultural and ﬁctional experiences. These cultural
and ﬁctional experiences are also characterized by movement; the movement of the
mind between diﬀerentiated experiences; and the narrative structure, just like the
structure of an institution, also provides the mechanism for integrating these
experiences and perspectives into a meaningful whole.
The importance of movement is most evident at the ideographic level of human
life trajectories. Social psychologists have often been criticized for neglecting con-
text (Jovchelovitch, 2007) and now it is common to emphasize the importance of
context (Howarth et al., in press); however, people don’t live in just one context
(Dreier, 2009); rather, they move between contexts (both social and ﬁctional). Such
movement between domains, we argue, is crucial to meaning making.
Consider the trajectory of Malcolm X, which passed through a wide range of
social positions. He was successful at school, became a gangster, was a prisoner,
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and became a religious minister in the Nation of Islam. Malcolm X’s peculiar
variant of international human rights activism only becomes intelligible against
this background. He combined meanings from school, the street, and religion
into a unique and powerful complex of meanings (Gillespie, 2005b, 2010a).
Similarly, young Turkish adolescents moving between the contexts of British
school and Turkish home, internalize the tensions of multicultural London, produ-
cing novel and creative syntheses (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008). Or consider the case
of June, a young woman living in England during World War II. During the course
of the war she moved from the periphery to increasing involvement. Analysis of her
diaries reveal how she accumulated experiences from diverse institutions (a local
community, summer classes at University, life on the farm), relationships (family
members, instructors and boyfriends) and ﬁctional experiences (including propa-
ganda and Walt Disney movies), and how she combines these to make her own
reaction to events (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling, & Zittoun, 2008; Zittoun, Cornish,
Gillespie, & Aveling, 2008). At the end of the war, these multiplicities of represen-
tations and positions, themselves in dialogue with new possibilities opened up
by ﬁction and new political programs, allowed her deﬁne her own original
synthesis (Zittoun, Aveling, Gillespie, & Cornish, 2012). What is crucial in all
these analyses of trajectories is how movement into a new experience in a situated
or ﬁctional domain provides a new vantage point on previous experiences, iden-
tities, and commitments. Distancing from everyday life begins, not with a psycho-
logical feat of reﬂection, but with the more mundane and explicable act of moving
into a new experience (whether structured by institutions or complex semiotic
artifacts).
The fact that humans can move is both elementary and profoundly constitutive.
It problematizes any opposition between self and other (because self can become
other; Gillespie, Howarth, & Cornish, 2012) and it enables us to reconceptualize
the relation between individuals and society (Akram, 2013). Individuals experience
society in a personal way (Zittoun, 2006), internalizing it as they move through it.
Societally structured experiences, facilitated by institutions and cultural artifacts,
progressively lead to an embodied internalization of society. The body is not only
the locus and medium of experience; it is also the means for society to reproduce
itself. Physical and semantic architectures channel and guide experience, leading us
from one experience to the next, and scaﬀolding both the diﬀerentiation and inte-
gration of these experiences. Does this put too much emphasis on societal deter-
mination? Where is personal meaning and agency? How does agency emerge from
this societal and cultural orchestration of experience?
Agency arises not because individuals are less determined by society, but rather
because they are over-determined. Life trajectories move people from one social
context to another, from one cultural experience to another, from one discourse to
another; and in so doing, people accumulate heterogeneous discourses, norms, arti-
facts and symbolic resources. A person’s trajectory through society and associated
accumulation creates an internal semiotic landscape that mirrors (from the perspec-
tive of the individual) the overlapping and dissonant semiotic structures of society.
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It is the overlap, the tensions, and contradictions between these internalizations
which create agency, and the space for reﬂective thought (Zittoun, 2012). Thus,
we maintain, beginning with the elementary movement of bodies in a social world
we can step-up to the complexity of psychological movements within semiotic
realms, and eventually the dynamics of distancing which enable human agency.
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Note
1. There is a lot of terminological confusion around the terms symbol, sign, signal and cue.
Our understanding is that there is a broad equivalence between that what Werner and
Kaplan (1963) term ‘‘symbol,’’ what Mead (1922; see also Gillespie, 2005a) termed
‘‘significant symbol’’ and what Vygotsky and Luria (1994/1932) termed ‘‘sign’’
(see Wagoner, 2010). In each case these terms are used to refer to a higher-order form
of meaning and representation. Cues and signals (and, for Mead, non-significant sym-
bols), on the other hand, generally refer to the non-intended triggers in the environment
(Gillespie, 2010b; Saleh, Scott, Bryning, & Chittka, 2007).
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